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THIRD-PARTY BANKRUPTCY RELEASES: AN
ANALYSIS OF CONSENT THROUGH THE LENSES
OF DUE PROCESS AND CONTRACT LAW
Dorothy Coco*
Bankruptcy courts disagree on the use of third-party releases in Chapter
11 bankruptcy plans, the different factors that circuit courts consider when
deciding whether to approve a third-party release, and the impact of the
various consent definitions on whether a release is or should be binding on
the creditor. Affirmative consent, “deemed consent,” and silence are
important elements in this discussion. Both contract law and due process
provide lenses to evaluate consent definitions to determine whether
nondebtor third-party releases should bind certain creditor groups. This
Note proposes a solution that follows an affirmative consent approach to
protect against due process violations and promote consistency across
bankruptcy courts.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts have difficulty applying a consistent standard for what constitutes
consent in third-party releases in Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan confirmations.
Chapter 11 refers to business reorganizations that typically propose a plan to
keep the business functioning both during and after the bankruptcy.1 A
Chapter 11 plan is a court-ordered agreement that satisfies the various
statutory requirements set out in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”) and
lays out the treatment of the debtor’s obligations with respect to each class
of creditors and interest holders.2 A third-party release allows a debtor to
extend a release to a nondebtor party3 who participates in or impacts the
debtor’s ability to reorganize.4 Courts generally approve nondebtor thirdparty releases as binding on creditors in Chapter 11 cases when there is
1. See John M. Czarnetzky, Time, Uncertainty, and the Law of Corporate
Reorganizations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2939, 2974 (1999) (“The congressional vision for a
chapter 11 case is for the parties to negotiate a consensual, binding plan of reorganization that
preserves the corporation’s ‘going concern’ value, defined as the value of the corporation
above its liquidation value.”); Chapter 11—Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/6VBM-2BG7] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019); see also 16
RICHARD LEVIN & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 21.11 (16th ed. 2019).
2. See LEVIN & SOMMER, supra note 1, § 21.11; see also Chapter 11—Bankruptcy
Basics, supra note 1.
3. “A debtor might seek to extend third party releases to co-debtors, officers, directors,
lenders, parents, guarantors, sureties, or insurance carriers where those parties could assert
post-confirmation indemnification claims against the debtor, or where the non-debtor party is
a potential source of funding for the plan of reorganization.” Michael S. Etkin & Nicole M.
Brown, Third Party Releases?—Not So Fast! Changing Trends and Heightened Scrutiny, 29
AIRA J., no. 3, 2015, at 22, 22.
4. See id.; see also Victoria Vron, Court Denies Plan Confirmation over Impermissible
Third-Party Releases, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (Oct. 21, 2010), https://business-financerestructuring.weil.com/releases-exculpations/court-denies-plan-confirmation-overimpermissible-third-party-releases/ [perma.cc/B5YW-W5L6] (“Some debtors may include
third-party releases in a chapter 11 plan with the mindset that there is no harm asking for the
third-party releases—if the court does not approve such releases, the court will just confirm
the plan without them.”).
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obvious affirmative consent where creditors opt in to the release;5 however,
in situations without explicit creditor consent, approval occurs only in limited
or extraordinary circumstances.6
Situations where an express response from creditors is not present or
required are controversial, as what constitutes “deemed” or implied consent
varies across courts.7 This Note examines statutes, cases, contract law, and
constitutional principles to help define consent in the bankruptcy release
context.8 Differing opinions regarding consent requirements within judicial
districts and across circuits leads to inconsistent application of the Code and
differing results depending on the filing location.9 Some of these cases
purport to bind creditors despite the absence of clear approval for such a
release and thus raise due process concerns. Inconsistent interpretations of
the Code, as well as differing requirements for approving third-party releases,
may lead to forum shopping. The enforcement and permissibility of a release
may depend on the “luck of the draw” in terms of the assigned judge.10 For
example, there is no consensus even among judges within the Southern
District of New York or the District of Delaware—both of which frequently
hear large, high-profile Chapter 11 cases.11
This Note examines the various definitions of consent utilized in
bankruptcy reorganizations and the potential due process violations
5. See, e.g., In re SunEdison, Inc., 576 B.R. 453, 458 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017).
6. William P. Weintraub, Permissibility of Third-Party Releases in Non-Asbestos Cases,
32 REV. BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 137, 137 (2016).
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. Some believe the problems surrounding third-party releases stem from statutory
conflicts regarding the permissibility of such releases and court perceptions of how those
statutes interact. See Etkin & Brown, supra note 3, at 22.
9. See Samuel Schwartz & Kristina Perez, 3rd-Party Releases Bring Chapter 11 Venue
Considerations, LAW360 (Nov. 13, 2018, 4:31 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1101522/3rd-party-releases-bring-chapter-11-venue-considerations [https://perma.cc/EF3BBR6N]; see also Jill B. Bienstock, Recent SDNY Decision Adds to the Fray: When Do Courts
Approve Non-Consensual Releases?, COLE SCHOTZ P.C. (June 3, 2019), https://
www.csbankruptcyblog.com/2019/06/articles/bankruptcy/recent-sdny-decision-adds-to-thefray-when-can-courts-approve-non-consensual-releases/ [https://perma.cc/QJ7R-74QD].
10. “[B]ankruptcy practitioners should heavily vet where they file bankruptcy cases,
especially if they know third-party, nondebtors releases may be necessary to confirm the
Chapter 11 plan.” Schwartz & Perez, supra note 9.
11. Jay M. Goffman & George N. Panagakis, Trends in Chapter 11 Filings, Venue and
Proposed Reforms, SKADDEN (Jan. 2015), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/
2015/01/trends-in-chapter-11-filings-venue-and-proposed-re [https://perma.cc/XYJ4-8KDF]
(“The District of Delaware and the Southern District of New York attracted more than 14
percent of all 2014 corporate bankruptcy cases filed (measured as of the end of September
2014) and 17 percent of all such cases filed since 2001. These jurisdictions have received an
even larger share of large public company Chapter 11 filings. Since 1980, 36 percent of such
cases have been filed in the District of Delaware and 20 percent have been filed in the Southern
District of New York. By comparison, the next most-frequent venue (the Northern District of
Texas) accounted for less than 4 percent of all large public company filings during the same
period. These venue trends have intensified in recent years, with the District of Delaware and
the Southern District of New York attracting more than 75 percent of large public company
filings since 2010.”); see also In re Aegean Marine Petroleum Network Inc., 599 B.R. 717,
726 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Almost every proposed Chapter 11 Plan that I receive includes
proposed releases.”).
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associated with third-party releases. This Note proposes a solution to reduce
inconsistency in support of clearer affirmative consent requirements.
Part I of this Note distinguishes consensual and nonconsensual third-party
releases used in some Chapter 11 plans and discusses the split within districts
and across circuits prompted by this distinction. Part I also examines the
potential due process violations that may result from the treatment of
creditors or claimholders purportedly bound to such plans. Part II analyzes
various courts’ differing definitions of consent—affirmative consent,
deemed consent, and silence—and explores the due process concerns
surrounding both the relinquishment of claims and the applied consent
definition. Part III proposes a standard that courts and practitioners could
use when deciding whether to approve or create a plan. This Note concludes
that creditors should give affirmative consent for a court to bind them to a
third-party release. An affirmative consent requirement for third-party
releases would protect creditors’ due process rights.
I. THE WHO, WHAT, WHERE, AND WHY OF THIRD-PARTY RELEASES
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code enables the reorganization of a
corporation’s finances and operations. This reorganization often allows a
business to continue running while paying its creditors over time.12 Thirdparty releases are used when a debtor seeks to extinguish claims,13 or rights
of payment, held between two nondebtor parties through confirmation of a
Chapter 11 plan14:
[A] release may seek to cover the debtor’s directors and officers, an
unsecured creditors’ committee and its members, a nondebtor plan
proponent, a plan sponsor, the debtor’s lenders and their agents, and other
parties who may have been actively engaged in the chapter 11 case and
perhaps made contributions to the process.15

The plan of reorganization is a highly negotiated, multiparty contract
between the debtor and its body of creditors and any other equity interests
12. Chapter 11—Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 1. Individuals can also file under Chapter
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (2012); Chapter 11—Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 1. There are
specific criteria for whether a corporation, company, or individual qualifies for a Chapter 11
bankruptcy. See Chapter 11—Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 1.
13. In the Bankruptcy Code, a claim is defined as a:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured; or (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2012).
14. AM. BANKR. INST., COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11 253 (2014),
https://abiworld.app.box.com/s/vvircv5xv83aavl4dp4h [perma.cc/DHC6-ZYZB]; see also
Van C. Durrer II et al., Overview of ABI Commission Report and Recommendation on the
Reform of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, SKADDEN 11–12 (Dec. 23, 2014),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2014/12/overview-of-abi-commissionreport-and-recommendati [perma.cc/2U4F-PLCN].
15. AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 14, at 253.
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that are not terminated under law.16 A debtor is a person or entity that files
for bankruptcy looking to be discharged from debt.17 A creditor is an entity
that holds a claim against the debtor that arises before the debtor files for
bankruptcy.18 Debtors often utilize third-party releases to incentivize parties
to support a plan or to influence others to contribute to and fund the plan.19
Nondebtor third parties under Chapter 11 are often insiders of the debtor—
such as directors and officers—as well as the debtor’s insurers or major plan
contributors.20
For a court to approve a debtor’s plan of reorganization—a necessary step
for the debtor to exit bankruptcy successfully—there must be at least one
impaired class of creditors that accepts the plan.21 Impairment is narrowly
defined; any change of a creditor’s rights against a debtor is viewed as an
impairment of a creditor’s claim.22 On the other hand, unimpaired creditor
claims are those unaltered and unaffected under the proposed plan.23 Each
unimpaired creditor receives exactly what it would have received had the
debtor-business or debtor-individual not filed for bankruptcy.24 This
distinction is important because only impaired creditors have the right to vote
on a plan.25 Unimpaired creditors are conclusively presumed to favor the
plan and do not vote on the plan.26 Unimpaired creditors retain their
monetary claim against the debtor and all rights of collection and
enforcement that are related to that claim.27 From the perspective of an

16. Czarnetzky, supra note 1, at 2975 n.218 (“[C]hapter 11 is based on a model of
flexibility, open bargaining, and freedom of contract. The basic premise is that the
stakeholders in the reorganization are free to carve up reorganization value in whatever
manner they see fit.” (quoting CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 824
(1997))).
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(13).
18. Id. § 101(10).
19. AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 14, at 255 (“A debtor may need the assistance of
nondebtor parties to effect its reorganization. This assistance may be in the form of service,
collaboration, funding, business commitments, or other means that allow the debtor to achieve
its objectives in the chapter 11 case or in its postconfirmation operations. Nondebtor parties
may be reluctant to contribute to the plan or the debtor’s reorganization efforts if the nondebtor
party might be exposed to liability or will have ongoing liability despite confirmation of the
chapter 11 plan.”).
20. See, e.g., SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert
Grp., Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (allowing releases of most of the securities claims
asserted against the debtor’s directors and officers); see also Etkin & Brown, supra note 3, at
22.
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124.
22. See 7 LEVIN & SOMMER, supra note 1, ¶ 1124.03. A creditor’s claim is impaired if
the proposed plan changes the original debt terms, such as reducing the interest rate or
lengthening the pay-out period. Id. Impairment happens even if the debt arrangement terms
are improved. Id. Examples include a decrease in the payback period or an increase in paid
interest. Id. ¶ 1124.03[5].
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1); 7 LEVIN & SOMMER, supra note 1, ¶ 1124.03.
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1); 7 LEVIN & SOMMER, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1124.02–1124.03.
25. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124; 7 LEVIN & SOMMER, supra note 1, ¶ 1124.03.
26. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1124(1), 1126(f); 7 LEVIN & SOMMER, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1124.02–
1124.03.
27. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1); 7 LEVIN & SOMMER, supra note 1, ¶ 1124.03.
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unimpaired creditor, it is as if the bankruptcy never happened as they get all
that was owed to them.
While holders of unimpaired claims are typically deemed to have
consented to the plan,28 courts disagree about whether a third-party release
really leaves a creditor unimpaired.29 A release relieves or waives the
nondebtor parties of liability for some specified claims and causes of action
that third parties may hold against them.30 A release is defined as a
relinquishment of a right, title, or claim.31
A Chapter 11 plan can only be confirmed if the court finds that the plan
complies with the entire Bankruptcy Code.32 Controversy surrounds the
permissibility and use of third-party releases, as various courts draw opposite
conclusions interpreting different sections of the Bankruptcy Code,
particularly §§ 524(e) and 105(a). Section 524(e) states that the discharge of
a debtor’s debt cannot affect other parties’ liability.33 Section 105(a) grants
bankruptcy judges broad equitable powers to take actions that are necessary
to implement the Bankruptcy Code.34 Once a plan is confirmed, the plan and
all of its provisions bind the debtor, creditors,35 and any other related entities
that benefit or are connected to the plan, regardless of impairment status or
whether the entity had voted to accept or reject the plan.36
Part I.A explores the minority view that disapproves of third-party
releases, whether consensual or nonconsensual, and claims that the Code
prohibits this practice. Part I.B lays out the majority view that approves of
third-party consensual releases, at least in certain circumstances. Part I.C
examines the Seventh Circuit’s view that third-party releases are permissible
28. 8 LEVIN & SOMMER, supra note 1, ¶ 1141.02[5][b].
29. Part II.A.3 discusses courts’ mixed responses regarding whether an otherwise
unimpaired creditor becomes impaired if the creditor is forced to release a claim.
30. AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 14, at 255.
31. Release, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Releases come up in a Chapter
11 confirmation plan, disclosure statement, and in the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 727(a) (explaining that “[t]he court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless [an exception
applies]”); 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (explaining that “the confirmation of a plan discharges the
debtor from any debt that arose before the date of [the] confirmation”); see also infra notes
40–43.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e); see infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. Some courts have
interpreted § 524(e) as a prohibition against nonconsensual third-party releases. See, e.g., Am.
Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 626
(9th Cir. 1989); see also infra Part I.A.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title
providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the
court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or
appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.”).
35. Creditors within a plan are not all equal and will be separated into classes to vote on
the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1).
36. AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 14, at 253 n.913; see also Sharon L. Levin et al., The
WaMu Lesson: Craft Your Releases Carefully, LAW360 (Jan. 28, 2011, 1:04 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/222713/the-wamu-lesson-craft-your-releases-carefully
[perma.cc/LBL2-YNVT] (discussing the rejection of the releases in In re Washington Mutual,
Inc., 442 B.R. 314 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011)).
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regardless of consent. Part I.D showcases the various standards that the
bankruptcy courts in different circuits use to determine the appropriateness
of the third-party release. Part I.E examines the rules surrounding clear and
conspicuous disclosure utilized in reorganizations that can be applied to
releases. Part I.F examines the connection between contract law and thirdparty releases. Finally, Part I.G examines the Due Process Clause and the
potential violations associated with certain third-party releases in situations
without affirmative consent.
A. Minority View of Third-Party Releases
Third-party releases are controversial because the Bankruptcy Code does
not explicitly authorize them—other than in asbestos cases.37 Circuits are
split on whether bankruptcy courts are empowered to grant such releases,
consensual or otherwise, outside of asbestos cases.38 This controversy is
greatest in relation to nonconsensual releases because the strongest statutory
authority for court approval of a release rests on the notion that bankruptcy
courts have inherent jurisdiction to settle cases and enforce contracts that are
necessary to complete a bankruptcy case;39 however, where the release is
nonconsensual, it is difficult to locate the contract at issue.
Courts differ in opinion on more than the breadth of the equitable authority
granted under § 105; they also differ on how to construe § 524(e). The

37. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(B); see also Chelsea Ireland, Discharging the Debt of a
Third-Party Non-Debtor Is Within the Authority of the Bankruptcy Courts, PROC. N.Y.U.
MOOT CT. BOARD (Dec. 2, 2017), https://proceedings.nyumootcourt.org/2017/12/dischargingthe-debt-of-a-third-party-non-debtor-is-within-the-authority-of-the-bankruptcy-courts/
[perma.cc/FR9N-Y3A4] (“[T]he requirements laid out in § 524(g) are indicative of the need
for a clear and specific process for organizing and overseeing asbestos cases, rather than of
Congress’s intention to drastically narrow the circumstances under which a third-party
discharge could be used. The inclusion of a third-party discharge . . . under § 524(g) was
therefore not meant to impose any additional restrictions on the bankruptcy courts . . . .”).
38. “The nub of the circuits’ disagreement concerns . . . whether § 524(e) . . . bars a
bankruptcy court from releasing non-debtors from liability to a creditor without the creditor’s
consent.” Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC (In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc.), 519 F.3d 640,
656 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that § 524(e) bars third-party releases); Deutsche Bank AG,
London Branch v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.),
416 F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that § 524(e) does not bar third-party releases).
39. For examples of such statutory authority, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 524, 1126–1129,
1141–1142.
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minority of circuit courts, which includes the Fifth,40 Ninth,41 and Tenth42
Circuits, hold that § 524(e) prohibits third-party releases.43 Section 524(e)
provides that the “discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability
of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt,”44
and these courts view third-party releases as the contractual equivalent of a
debtor-discharge, which releases the nondebtor entities from liabilities.45
Because the minority view finds third-party releases impermissible under
the Code, there are no discussions in these circuits regarding consent to
decide whether to bind creditors to a third-party release—they are not bound
because the release cannot be used.

40. The Fifth Circuit specifically rejects a bankruptcy court’s authority to confirm thirdparty releases on the basis that the releases have consequences not intended by Congress. Bank
of N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d
229, 252 (5th Cir. 2009); Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 761 (5th Cir.
1995) (holding that a bankruptcy court cannot approve third-party releases because approval
exceeds its powers under § 105; such authority would incentivize those who would receive a
release to push debtors into bankruptcy); see also Victoria Vron, The Future of Third-Party
Releases and Exculpations: A Look at the Fifth Circuit, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (Oct. 8, 2010),
https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/releases-exculpations/the-future-of-thirdparty-releases-and-exculpations-a-look-at-the-fifth-circuit/
[perma.cc/4CTA-RCEZ]
(analyzing the Fifth Circuit’s Pacific Lumber decision).
41. Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1401–02 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding that third-party releases violate § 524(e)); Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v.
Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that § 524(e) limits the court’s equitable power under § 105 to order the discharge of
nondebtor liabilities); Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he
bankruptcy court has no power to discharge the liabilities of a nondebtor pursuant to the
consent of creditors as part of a reorganization plan.”).
42. Landsing Diversified Props.-II v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Tulsa (In re W. Real
Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Congress did not intend to extend
such [discharge] benefits to third-party bystanders.”); In re Midway Gold US, Inc., 575 B.R.
475, 505–06 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2017) (holding that, although the Tenth Circuit does not forbid
third-party releases in Chapter 11 plans, the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate
releases of claims against nondebtors as the underlying claims should not be considered part
of the proceedings to confirm the plan and are not within its “core” or “related to” jurisdiction).
43. The actual language of § 524(e) does not expressly reference third-party releases.
These circuits believe that third-party releases are prohibited even if all creditors consent. See
Peter M. Boyle, Note, Non-Debtor Liability in Chapter 11: Validity of Third-Party Discharge
in Bankruptcy, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 421, 428 (1992). Mr. Boyle concludes that third-party
releases violate “the express command of section 524” and are “contrary to public policy.” Id.
at 450.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e).
45. Courts that follow the minority view find that the discharge of the debtor’s preconfirmation debts via the Code should not affect another entity’s liability. Kathrine A.
McLendon & Lily Picón, The Changing Landscape of Consensual Third-Party Releases in
Chapter 11 Plans: Does Silence = Consent?, HARV. L. SCH.: BANKR. ROUNDTABLE (May 7,
2018),
http://blogs.harvard.edu/bankruptcyroundtable/files/2018/05/The-ChangingLandscape-of-Consensual-Third-Party-Releases-in-Chapter-11-Plans.pdf [perma.cc/83S3C46N]; see also AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 14, at 254.
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B. Majority View of Third-Party Releases
Consensual releases involve a creditor who either affirmatively consents
or is deemed to consent to the third-party release.46 Releases may be coupled
with a reorganization plan and become enforceable based on general contract
law principles.47
The Bankruptcy Code does not directly state whether a third-party release
requires express consent; nevertheless, courts evaluate consent when
determining whether releases are permissible or should be approved.48
Additionally, consent is not defined in the Code in the context of third-party
releases, and courts inconsistently determine what qualifies as consent.49
In In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC,50 Judge Laurie Selber
Silverstein of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that
bankruptcy courts have constitutional authority to grant third-party releases
in a confirmation order regardless of creditor consent.51 This authority is
rooted in the idea that bankruptcy judges are constitutionally permitted to
enter final confirmation orders; therefore, they are authorized to approve a
plan containing a third-party release because the releases are part of the plan
confirmation.52
46. In re SunEdison, Inc., 576 B.R. 453, 458 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Courts generally
agree that an affirmative vote to accept a plan that contains a third-party release constitutes an
express consent to the release.”); see also Brad B. Erens, Second and Seventh Circuits Issue
Decisions on Third-Party Releases, JONES DAY:
INSIGHTS (May/June 2008),
https://www.jonesday.com/Second-and-Seventh-Circuits-Issue-Decisions-on-Third-PartyReleases-06-01-2008/# [perma.cc/8AU9-JCMX] (“Most courts do not find voluntary thirdparty releases controversial, since they essentially represent an agreement between the creditor
and the released nondebtor party.”).
47. In re SunEdison, 576 B.R. at 458 (first citing In re Neogenix Oncology, Inc., No. 1223557, 2015 WL 5786345, at *5 (Bankr. D. Md. Oct. 1, 2015); then citing In re Wash. Mut.,
Inc., 442 B.R. 314, 352 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011)) (“Courts generally apply contract principles in
deciding whether a creditor consents to a third-party release.”); see infra note 208 and
accompanying text. Voting to accept the plan may count as acceptance of a proposed release
provision contained in it, but a release may be enforceable in other instances as well. See infra
Part II (discussing instances where courts consider acceptance).
48. In re Nickels Midway Pier, LLC, No. 03-49462 (GMB), 2010 WL 2034542, at *13
(Bankr. D.N.J. May 21, 2010); In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 111 (Bankr. D. Del.
1999).
49. See infra Part II (discussing the various consent definitions that different courts have
applied).
50. 575 B.R. 252 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Opt-Out Lenders v. Millennium
Lab Holdings II, LLC (In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC) 591 B.R. 559 (D. Del. 2018).
51. Id. at 274; see also Opt-Out Lenders v. Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC (In re
Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC), 591 B.R. 559, 586 (D. Del. 2018); Jeff Montgomery,
Trustee Objects to Takata’s Ch. 11 Liability Releases, LAW360 (Jan. 31, 2018, 8:24 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1007790/trustee-objects-to-takata-s-ch-11-liability-releases
[perma.cc/EUN4-BY26].
52. See In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, 575 B.R. at 265–79; Matt Chiappardi, 3rdParty Release Constitutional, Millennium Labs Judge Says, LAW360 (Oct. 3, 2017, 9:21 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/971044/3rd-party-release-constitutional-millennium-labsjudge-says [perma.cc/2QUG-9Q6K]; Matthew Kelsey, J. Eric Wise & Matthew Porcelli, A
Tale of 2 Cases on 3rd-Party Releases, LAW360 (Nov. 9, 2017, 5:43 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/984058/a-tale-of-2-cases-on-3rd-party-releases
[https://
perma.cc/E5EC-H5K7]. While Millennium Lab II is in conflict with Washington Mutual, the
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A majority of circuit courts, which includes the Second,53 Third,54
Fourth,55 Sixth,56 Seventh,57 and Eleventh58 Circuits, hold that enforcement
of consensual third-party releases is permissible in appropriate, limited
circumstances59 if certain factors exist60 and that enforcement of
nonconsensual releases should only be permitted in unusual circumstances.61
Third Circuit denied the petition for appeal to rule on the difference. See In re Millennium Lab
Holdings, No. 16–8017, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20441 (3d Cir. Feb. 24, 2016) (denying
petition to appeal); infra notes 157–58 and accompanying text; see also Marion M. Quirk &
Jonathan A. Grasso, Millennium Lab, Update on Non-Debtor Third-Party Releases, COLE
SCHOTZ P.C. (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.csbankruptcyblog.com/2016/10/articles/
bankruptcy/millennium-lab-update-non-debtor-third-party-releases/
[perma.cc/WS76XGH8].
53. Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re
Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that, to confirm
a Chapter 11 plan containing a nondebtor release, the release had to be important and necessary
to the plan); SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp.,
Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that releases of third parties may be approved
if found to play an important role in the plan).
54. Gillman v. Cont’l Airlines (In re Cont’l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 212–14 (3d Cir. 2000)
(holding that nonconsensual third-party releases should be granted only in extraordinary cases
and evidence is needed that shows the release was necessary and fair).
55. Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 1989)
(holding that § 524(e) must not be applied literally to prohibit bankruptcy courts from
approving a third-party release); see Nat’l Heritage Found., Inc. v. Highbourne Found., 760
F.3d 344, 347 (4th Cir. 2014) (confirming that third-party releases are permissible in
appropriate circumstances but denying them because the Dow Corning factors were not met);
see also Christopher Hopkins, The Fourth Circuit Provides a Useful Roadmap for Debtors
Seeking Third-Party Releases, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (July 17, 2014), https://business-financerestructuring.weil.com/releases-exculpations/the-fourth-circuit-provides-a-useful-roadmapfor-debtors-seeking-third-party-releases/ [https://perma.cc/8RL8-MFW3] (“[C]ourts will not
simply ‘rubber stamp’ third-party releases absent creditor consent unless the debtor is able to
prove that the unique circumstances of the case justify the release.”).
56. Class Five Nev. Claimants (00-2516) v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning
Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 656–57 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that § 524(e) merely “explains the
effect of a debtor’s discharge” and “does not prohibit the release of a non-debtor”).
57. In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[A] per se rule
disfavoring all releases in a reorganization plan would be . . . unwarranted, if not a misreading
of [§ 524(e)].”).
58. SE Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc. (In re Seaside Eng’g &
Surveying, Inc.), 780 F.3d 1070, 1079 (11th Cir. 2015) (approving third-party releases using
the Dow Corning factors and noting that the factors are nonexclusive and not all must be
satisfied).
59. Most courts acknowledge that third-party releases are an exception, not a rule. See,
e.g., Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re
Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that third-party
releases are allowed but recognizing that “it is clear that such a release is proper in only rare
cases”); In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 657–58 (noting that third-party releases are “a
dramatic measure to be used cautiously”); In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d at 212–13
(recognizing that third-party releases have only been approved in “extraordinary cases”); In
re Transit Grp., Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 817 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (“In addition, the courts
allowing non-debtor releases hold that the granting of such releases is justified only in unusual
circumstances. Routine inclusion of nondebtor releases is not appropriate.”).
60. See infra Part I.C (discussing the various factor breakdowns by circuit).
61. The circuit split between the majority and minority views has grown over the decades.
See Boyle, supra note 43 (providing a pre-1992 analysis of the interpretations of third-party
releases).
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While the First and Eighth Circuits have yet to decide on the permissibility
of third-party releases, lower courts in both the First62 and Eighth63 Circuits
have indicated agreement with the majority view.
The majority of circuits find the releases permissible by relying on the
equitable powers granted to bankruptcy courts under § 105(a) of the Code.64
The majority holds that § 105(a) grants bankruptcy courts the authority to
approve nondebtor releases under appropriate circumstances due to the
equitable powers available to the bankruptcy courts.65 These courts consider
the permissibility of a particular release through case-specific inquiries of
consensual determinations and application of the circuit standards for release
usage and approval.66 Furthermore, the majority rejects the minority’s notion
that § 524(e) prohibits bankruptcy courts from approving plans with thirdparty releases on the grounds that § 524(e) merely explains the effect of a
debtor’s discharge and does not prohibit the release of a nondebtor through
some means other than a discharge.67
62. See Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973, 983–84 (1st Cir. 1995)
(expressing no view on the applicability and acceptance of third-party releases). Within the
First Circuit, bankruptcy courts find jurisdiction to confirm plans that include third-party
releases but state that the ability should be exercised with restraint. See, e.g., In re Grove
Instruments, Inc., 573 B.R. 307, 314 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2017); In re Charles St. African
Methodist Episcopal Church of Bos., 499 B.R. 66, 100–02 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013) (finding
jurisdiction and authority to enter an order releasing third-party claims); In re Quincy Med.
Ctr., Inc., No. 11-16394, 2011 WL 5592907, at *2–4 (Bankr. D. Mass. Nov. 16, 2011) (holding
that the court had jurisdiction to enter an order releasing third-party claims, but it needed the
affected parties’ consent); In re Mahoney Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 285, 297–300 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2002) (recognizing court authority for approving third-party releases).
63. In re U.S. Fidelis, Inc., 481 B.R. 503, 519 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2012) (“[T]he court may
confirm a plan that includes compelled releases of non-debtors . . . . [I]f exceptional
circumstances exist, the releases are widely supported by the creditor constituency (including
those creditors who will be restrained), the constituency to be restrained receives significant
benefits, and the creditors as a whole are being treated fairly.”).
64. SE Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc. (In re Seaside Eng’g &
Surveying, Inc.), 780 F.3d 1070, 1076 (11th Cir. 2015); Class Five Nev. Claimants (00-2516)
v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 656 (6th Cir. 2002); Gillman
v. Cont’l Airlines (In re Cont’l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Specialty
Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1993); Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins
Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 701 (4th Cir. 1989); MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re JohnsManville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1988).
65. See generally Jason W. Harbour & Tara L. Elgie, Fourth Circuit Declines to Adopt
Blanket Rule Against Nonconsensual Nondebtor Releases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2012, at
65. The pro-release courts sometimes point to § 1123(b)(6) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 3016(c) to show congressional intent to support using third-party releases. See, e.g.,
Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC (In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc.), 519 F.3d 640, 657 (7th
Cir. 2008); Bank of N.Y., Mellon Tr. Co. v. Becker (In re Lower Bucks Hosp.), 488 B.R. 303,
318–19 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013); In re Gen. Growth Props. Inc., No. 09-11977, 2010 Bankr.
LEXIS 5689, at *10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2010).
66. AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 14, at 254.
67. See, e.g., Behrmann v. Nat’l Heritage Found., Inc., 663 F.3d 704, 710 (4th Cir. 2011)
(citing In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 701); see also In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc., 519
F.3d at 656–57; In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 657–58; Stuart, L.L.C. v. First Mount
Vernon Indus. Loan Ass’n (In re Peramco Int’l, Inc.), 3 F. App’x 38, 42 (4th Cir. 2001); SEC
v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc.), 960 F.2d
285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992).
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C. Seventh Circuit Anomaly: Consent Determination Is Unnecessary
The Seventh Circuit reads the Code provisions differently than the other
circuit courts of appeals, but its reading appears to be a variation on the
majority view’s statutory analysis. It views third-party releases as entirely
acceptable where appropriate or necessary, with or without consent, and
bases this reading on the equitable authority granted to bankruptcy courts in
§ 105(a) and the broad language of § 1123(b)(6).68 The Seventh Circuit
believes a bankruptcy court’s powers are not limited when deciding whether
to grant a nondebtor third-party release in a bankruptcy plan confirmation.69
Reaching out to an additional provision of the Code, the Seventh Circuit
roots its reasoning for permissibility in § 1123(b) rather than in just §§ 105
and 524(e). This is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Law
v. Siegel,70 which stated that § 105(a) does not permit bankruptcy courts to
deviate from or act in contravention of other sections of the Code.71 Section
1123(b)(6) permits a court to “include any other appropriate provision not
inconsistent with [the Bankruptcy Code].”72 The Seventh Circuit does not
view § 524(e) as banning third-party releases or § 105 as explicitly
permitting them;73 rather, § 524(e) merely “limits the operation of other parts
of the bankruptcy code and preserves rights that might otherwise be
construed as lost after the reorganization.”74 The Seventh Circuit held,
“where Congress has limited the powers of the bankruptcy court, it has done
so clearly . . . by expressly limiting the court’s power.”75 Therefore, the
Seventh Circuit construes the broad language of authority in § 105(a) along
with § 1123(b)(6) to ultimately approve of third-party releases.
D. Judicial Standards Used to Determine Whether to Approve a ThirdParty Release
In circuits where third-party releases are permissible, various standards are
followed to determine approval of such releases. Courts lay out limited
68. In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc., 519 F.3d at 657. The Seventh Circuit stated that
determining appropriateness is fact intensive, case specific, and depends on the nature of the
reorganization. Id. The third-party release must (1) be narrowly tailored, (2) not constitute a
“blanket immunity,” and (3) be essential to the debtor’s reorganization. Id.
69. Id. at 656–57 (first citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939); then citing
United States v. Energy Res. Co., Inc., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990)). A bankruptcy court applies
the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence, and those equitable powers are traditionally
broad. Id. “Section 105(a) codifies this understanding of the bankruptcy court’s powers by
giving it the authority to effect any ‘necessary or appropriate’ order to carry out the provisions
of the bankruptcy code.” Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012). A bankruptcy court is also
able to “exercise these broad equitable powers within the plans of reorganization themselves.”
In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc., 519 F.3d at 657; see also 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
70. 571 U.S. 415 (2014).
71. Id. at 421–22.
72. In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc., 519 F.3d at 657 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6)
(2006)).
73. Id. at 656 (citing In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1993)).
74. In re Specialty Equip., 3 F.3d at 1047; see also In re Hunter, 970 F.2d 299, 311 (7th
Cir. 1992).
75. In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc., 519 F.3d at 656 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 105(b) (2006)).
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circumstances for approval of third-party releases to prevent abuse of the
bankruptcy process.76
The Second Circuit considers the following factors found in In re
Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.77: (1) whether the estate has received a
substantial contribution; (2) whether the enjoined claims are channeled into
a settlement fund rather than extinguished; (3) whether the enjoined claims
would indirectly impact the debtor’s reorganization through claims of
indemnity or contribution; (4) whether the plan otherwise provides for
payment in full of the enjoined claims; and (5) whether the creditor has
consented.78
The Third Circuit follows the factors laid out in In re Master Mortgage
Investment Fund, Inc.79 and In re Continental Airlines.80 A commission of
the American Bankruptcy Institute81 (ABI) recommended that all bankruptcy
courts apply the “Master Mortgage factors,”82 which lower courts already
apply in the Third83 and Eighth Circuits.84 Those five factors consider:
(1) the identity of interest between the debtor and the third party, usually
an indemnity relationship, such that a suit against the nondebtor is, in
essence, a suit against the debtor or will deplete assets of the estate;
76. Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re
Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that a third-party
release “lends itself to abuse” because it effectively operates as a bankruptcy discharge without
the necessity to file a bankruptcy). This fear was not unfounded. In two large mass tort cases,
In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989) and In re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d
89 (2d Cir. 1988), allegations arose that solvent companies were inappropriately filing for
Chapter 11 protection because the management wanted to limit their liability. Boyle, supra
note 43, at 444.
77. 416 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2005).
78. Id. at 142–44.
79. 168 B.R. 930 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994).
80. 203 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2000).
81. The ABI is an organization of judges, attorneys, professors, and accountants who
specialize in bankruptcy. See AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 14, at 2–3. It provides reports and
recommendations to Congress and the public regarding bankruptcy regulations, laws, and
trends. Id. The ABI released a study on Chapter 11 plan practices, issuing recommendations
not explicitly permitted by law. See generally id.
82. AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 14, at 256. The commission also examined the Dow
Corning factors but ultimately decided that these factors were inadequate and picked the
Master Mortgage factors as they “adequately capture[d] the careful review required in these
cases and declined to incorporate separate identification of unique or unusual circumstances.”
Id.; see also In re Master Mortg. Inv. Fund, 168 B.R. at 935 (listing the factors); infra notes
90–92 and accompanying text (providing the Dow Corning factors and analysis).
83. See In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 442 B.R. 314, 349 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011); Etkin & Brown,
supra note 3, at 24–28. Judge Brendan L. Shannon in In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC stated
that courts in Delaware follow the Master Mortgage factors, sometimes called “Zenith
factors,” in deciding whether to grant a third-party release as part of a plan. See 486 B.R. 286,
303 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013) (citing In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 110 (Bankr. D. Del.
1999)). However, Judge Shannon believes bankruptcy courts can take a flexible approach in
determining whether third-party releases are consensual. See Christopher A. Ward & Jarrett
Vine, Delaware Opinion in Indianapolis Downs Case Expands Third Party Releases and
Approves Post-Petition Lock-Up Agreements, POLSINELLI SHUGHART (Mar. 2013),
https://sftp.polsinelli.com/publications/bankruptcy/upd0313bfr.htm [https://perma.cc/V563D6EM].
84. See, e.g., In re U.S. Fidelis, Inc. 481 B.R. 503, 518–21 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2012).
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(2) whether the nondebtor has contributed substantial assets to the
reorganization; (3) whether the injunction is essential to reorganization;
(4) whether a substantial majority of the creditors agree to such
injunction—specifically, whether the impacted class or classes have
“overwhelmingly” voted to accept the proposed plan treatment; and
(5) whether the plan provides a mechanism for the payment of all, or
substantially all, of the claims of the class or classes affected by the
injunction.85

The ABI preferred the Master Mortgage factors because all five factors
captured the necessary careful review courts should undertake when
considering approval of a plan containing third-party releases.86 Various
courts that have applied the Master Mortgage factors have also stated that it
is not an exclusive list but rather a guide or tool in determining approval.87
The “Continental Airlines factors,” sometimes discussed in the Third
Circuit,88 highlight the “hallmarks” of permissible releases in consideration
of: (1) the fairness of the release, (2) whether the releases are necessary to
the reorganization, and (3) whether fair consideration has been given in
exchange for the release.89
The Sixth Circuit follows a different set of factors for the use of third-party
releases, known as the “Dow Corning factors.”90 This standard would
approve third-party releases if:
(1) There is an identity of interests between the debtor and the third party,
usually an indemnity relationship, such that a suit against the non-debtor is,
in essence, a suit against the debtor or will deplete the assets of the estate;
(2) The non-debtor has contributed substantial assets to the reorganization;
(3) The injunction is essential to reorganization, namely, the reorganization
hinges on the debtor being free from indirect suits against parties who
would have indemnity or contribution claims against the debtor; (4) The
impacted class, or classes, has overwhelmingly voted to accept the plan;
(5) The plan provides a mechanism to pay for all, or substantially all, of the
class or classes affected by the injunction; (6) The plan provides an
opportunity for those claimants who choose not to settle to recover in full
and; (7) The bankruptcy court made a record of specific factual findings
that support its conclusions.91

85. Id. (citing In re Master Mortg. Inv. Fund, 168 B.R. at 937–38).
86. Id.
87. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Wilmington Tr. Co. (In re Spansion, Inc.), 426 B.R. 114,
143 n.47 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010); In re Zenith Elecs., 241 B.R. at 110–11; In re Master Mortg.
Inv. Fund, 168 B.R. at 937.
88. See, e.g., In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC, 575 B.R. 252, 272–73 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Opt-Out Lenders v. Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC (In re
Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC), 591 B.R. 559 (D. Del. 2018).
89. Gillman v. Cont’l Airlines (In re Cont’l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2000);
see also Vron, supra note 4.
90. Class Five Nev. Claimants (00-2516) v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning
Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002).
91. Id. (first citing Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 701–
02 (4th Cir. 1989); then citing MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Mansville
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The Fourth Circuit also applies the Dow Corning factors.92
E. Clear and Conspicuous Disclosure
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3016(c) requires specific and
conspicuous language in a disclosure statement to identify all entities subject
to an injunction.93 Rule 2002(c)(3) requires the plan to include a statement
with conspicuous language if a plan proposes an injunction, as well as a
description of that injunction and those subject to said injunction.94 Rule
3020(c)(1) requires the plan confirmation order to describe in reasonable
detail the acts enjoined, specify the terms, and identify the entities subject to
the injunction.95
The Third Circuit in In re Lower Bucks Hospital96 rejected a third-party
release because the release was not properly disclosed to the creditors or the
court at the appropriate time,97 as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).98 In
addition to the third-party release being omitted from numerous sections, the
court stated: “[n]o use was made of underlined, italicized or boldfaced text
to emphasize the Release or to distinguish it from the more typical releases
between the parties to the settlement.”99
F. Contract Law
Some bankruptcy courts analogize bankruptcy plans containing third-party
releases to a contract that binds those who vote in favor of it.100 A waiver, a
common contract law concept, is a voluntary relinquishment of a known
right.101 The debtors and courts can potentially construe and view the plan

Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 92–94 (2d Cir. 1988); and then citing In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d at
214).
92. Nat’l Heritage Found., Inc. v. Highbourne Found., 760 F.3d 344, 348–51 (4th Cir.
2014).
93. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3016(c).
94. Id. r. 2002(c)(3).
95. Id. r. 3020(c)(1).
96. 571 F. App’x 139 (3d Cir. 2014).
97. Id. at 144 (“Key terms of a plan of confirmation, particularly those that release a nondebtor from claims by creditors, must be adequately disclosed. Failure to do so in a clear and
conspicuous manner risks excision of the release from the plan.”); see also Adam Lavine,
Indecent Disclosure: How the Failure to Disclose a Third-Party Release Led to Its Undoing,
WEIL BANKR. BLOG (July 23, 2014), https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/chapter11-plans/indecent-disclosure-how-the-failure-to-disclose-a-third-party-release-led-to-itsundoing/ [https://perma.cc/S97K-VLRA].
98. Section 1125(a)(1) states: “‘adequate information’ means information of a kind, and
in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history of the
debtor and the condition of the debtor’s books and records.” 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012).
99. In re Lower Bucks Hosp., 571 F. App’x at 143.
100. See, e.g., In re Coram Healthcare Corp., 315 B.R. 321, 336 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004); In
re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 506 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997). Courts in agreement with
the view that releases can be examined through the lens of contract law find that, when a thirdparty release is voluntary, “it is no different from any other settlement or contract.” In re
Arrowmill Dev., 211 B.R. at 506.
101. 8 TIMOTHY MURRAY, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 40.1 (rev. ed. 2019).
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of reorganization as a unilateral contract.102 Then, the court determines what
constitutes acceptance of the unilateral offer of the plan; that acceptance is
also known as consent.103
Under contract law principles, consent may be express or manifested by
conduct.104 “Courts generally agree that an affirmative vote to accept a plan
that contains a third-party release constitutes an express consent to the
release.”105 This determination of acceptance is at the heart of disagreement
among courts as to whether a release is consensual and, if so, how that
consent is obtained.106
Contractual rights may be waived if they are knowingly, voluntarily, and
intentionally relinquished.107 Any competent adult can release a legal right,
and once abandoned, it is gone forever.108 “[S]uch abandonment ‘may be
established by affirmative conduct or by failure to act so as to evince an intent
not to claim a purported advantage.’”109
A waiver may be express or inferred from actions or conduct, but the facts
must amount to an intentional relinquishment of a known right.110 The party
asserting a waiver has no requirement to show prejudice or detrimental
reliance, but good faith and fair dealing are frequently associated with waiver
discussions.111 Issuing a waiver is “within the control of the party who
chooses to relinquish” their right.112 The nonconsenting creditors in the
general plan—those who voted “no” on the plan’s confirmation and are still
bound to the plan—ordinarily would not be bound if the plan of
reorganization were just a contract because it would be viewed as a
nonacceptance; they are bound, however, because bankruptcy courts have the
power to bind them via the confirmation process.113 If creditors receive
adequate consideration for releasing their claims, courts do not typically find
a problem with a release as there is a contract made amongst the relevant
parties involved.114
102. “Many courts have employed the legal precept that a . . . plan is a court-sanctioned
contract that binds the . . . debtor and its creditors.” In re Stuart, 402 B.R. 111, 126 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2009) (citing In re Harvey, 213 F.3d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 2000)). “[I]t may be more
accurate to conceptualize a . . . plan that is confirmed without debtor-creditor negotiation as a
specialized type of contract—perhaps more like a unilateral contract.” Id. at 126 n.23.
103. Id.
104. In re SunEdison, Inc., 576 B.R. 453, 458 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
105. In re SunEdison, 576 B.R. at 458 (collecting cases).
106. See infra Part II (discussing the various definitions of consent to a third-party release).
107. See, e.g., Parsons v. Halliburton Energy Servs., 785 S.E.2d 844, 851 (W. Va. 2016).
108. McElroy v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 73 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 1996).
109. Morrison v. Buffalo Bd. of Educ., 741 F. App’x 827, 830 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting
Fundamental Portfolio Advisors, Inc. v. Tocqueville Asset Mgmt., L.P., 850 N.E.2d 653, 817
(N.Y. 2006)).
110. MURRAY, supra note 101, § 40.1.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (2012).
114. In re SunEdison, Inc., 576 B.R. 453, 458 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (first citing In re
Neogenix Oncology, Inc., No. 12-23557, 2015 WL 5786345, at *5 (Bankr. D. Md. Oct. 1,
2015); then citing In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 442 B.R. 314, 352 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011))
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G. The Due Process Clause
Due process questions arise when determining whether to approve thirdparty releases in a bankruptcy plan without consent or through implied
consent. This is because the releases may deprive individuals of a
fundamental right and interfere with the free exercise of the rights of
individuals forced into accepting these releases.115 Due process is explicitly
stated in the Fifth116 and Fourteenth Amendments.117 The Supreme Court
has interpreted the due process requirement set out in both clauses
identically.118 Due process has long been considered a fundamental principle
of fairness.119 Procedural due process demands an opportunity to be
heard.120 In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,121 the Court defined
the property interest protected by due process as a “legitimate claim of
entitlement” to the item or benefit in question that is “defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law.”122 Due process is an individual right, so all legal procedures set by
statute and court practice must be followed so no prejudicial or unequal
treatment results.123
To find that a due process violation exists, courts must determine if there
is a deprivation of a person’s life, liberty, or property without the opportunity
to be heard.124 In bankruptcy third-party releases, it must be determined
whether the court is unlawfully depriving such an interest via a release that
115. In re Aegean Marine Petroleum Network, Inc., 599 B.R. 717, 729 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2019) (holding that the nonconsensual releases will not be approved because no proper
justification was found “to take away the rights that claimants may have to pursue claims that
they own directly against the officers and directors”); Transcript of Hearing at 36, In re
Cumulus Media Inc., No. 17-13381 (SCC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y Feb. 1, 2018), ECF No. 434
[hereinafter Cumulus Transcript] (“I’m a huge fan of due process . . . I don’t want anybody to
inadvertently relinquish rights that they have and that might be meaningful to them. So I’m
happy to continue the discussion at confirmation.”); see also Boyle, supra note 43, at 447.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”). The Fifth Amendment applies only to the federal
government.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . .”). The Fourteenth Amendment applies only to
states and their subdivisions.
118. Justice Felix Frankfurter explained in Malinski v. New York, “[t]o suppose that ‘due
process of law’ meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the Fourteenth is too
frivolous to require elaborate rejection.” 324 U.S. 401, 415 (1945).
119. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976).
120. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (“A fundamental requirement of due
process is ‘the opportunity to be heard.’” (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914))).
121. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
122. Id. at 577 (holding that the plaintiff did not have a sufficient property interest for his
due process right to have been violated).
123. Robert P. Capistrano, 5.1.B Express Causes of Action, Section 1983, Due Process
Claims
and
Procedural
Issues,
CLEARINGHOUSE
COMMUNITY,
http://
www.federalpracticemanual.org/chapter5/section1b#footnoteref1_1i4nzyp [https://perma.cc/
QF9E-S5KU] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
124. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
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is not expressly consensual, or even expressly nonconsensual. The Supreme
Court views fundamental liberty interests as limited to rights that are
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor
justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed,”125 or rights that are “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”126 The right to petition and the
right to seek redress of grievances are considered guaranteed under the First
Amendment.127 In 1983, the Court set out the principle that “the right of
access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the
Government for redress of grievances.”128 Additionally, in 2002, the Court
stated it had long viewed the right to sue in court as a form of petition.129
In third-party releases, the creditors whose claims are under consideration
for release are potentially losing a legitimate claim of entitlement defined by
state law and the Constitution—the right to petition.130 These claims may
include breach of fiduciary duty, personal injury, and torts, among other
claims.131 According to the Bankruptcy Code, a class of claims accepts a
plan if the plan has been approved by creditors holding at least two-thirds in
dollar amount and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims.132 A
plan is consensually confirmed if every class approves, which
consequentially means up to one-third in any or every class could have voted
“no” on the plan.133 A class of consenting creditors that make up the majority
can strip the minority of their third-party claims against their consent if the
plan contains one or more third-party releases. This presents a due process
125. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191–92 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
126. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
127. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.”).
128. Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (citing Cal. Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)).
129. BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 524–25 (2002) (“We have recognized
this right to petition as one of ‘the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of
Rights’ . . . and have explained that the right is implied by ‘the very idea of a government,
republican in form.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. Bar
Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967); then quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552
(1876))).
130. Judge Michael E. Wiles in In re Aegean Marine Petroleum Network, Inc. stated, “we
should not lose sight of the fact that when we impose involuntary releases we do not provide
claimants with other procedural and substantive rights that they ordinarily would have.” 599
B.R. 717, 725 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019); see also In re Digital Impact, Inc. 223 B.R. 1, 13 n.6
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998) (noting that a third-party release has “the effect of a judgment—a
judgment against the claimant and in favor of the non-debtor, accomplished without due
process”).
131. Jason Binford, Beware of Third-Party Releases in Bankruptcy, HOTEL NEWS NOW
(Dec. 14, 2015, 7:08 AM), http://www.hotelnewsnow.com/Articles/28778/Beware-of-thirdparty-releases-in-bankruptcy [https://perma.cc/F89K-UGVZ].
132. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(c)–(d), 1129 (2012). “A class of claims has accepted a plan if such
plan has been accepted by creditors . . . that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than
one-half in number of the allowed claims of such class held by creditors . . . that have accepted
or rejected such plan.” Id. § 1126(c).
133. See id. § 1126.
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problem as the creditors are being stripped of a right. Without a requirement
to opt-out of a third-party release, the dissenters are bound by the claim
release even if one-third of the class votes against the plan or remains silent
and less than half of the value claims also vote against it or remain silent.
According to the Supreme Court, “some form of hearing is required before
an individual is finally deprived of a property interest.”134 Additionally, the
Court has stated that the right to be heard before suffering a loss is a basic
societal principle.135 The definition of that loss could perhaps include the
nonconsensual loss of a contractual right or right to pursue a claim or cause
of action, like those found in third-party releases.
II. THIRD-PARTY RELEASES AND CONSENT
Determining the permissibility and scope of third-party release provisions
in Chapter 11 plans is a case-specific inquiry whose outcome varies based on
the jurisdiction and debtors’ circumstances.136 Recent case law addresses the
various outcomes as to whether third-party releases are permissible and
focuses on what constitutes consent for a third-party release in different
districts.137 This Note discusses court opinions on whether such consent
must be express rather than implied or deemed. Further, the court opinions
discuss how such consent must be obtained. No clear standard exists for how
courts should determine Chapter 11 creditors’ consent in a restructuring plan,
which results in inconsistent application across districts and between judges
within the same districts.138 In some jurisdictions, creditors who do not
affirmatively consent or remain silent can be bound by a release that
extinguishes claims and causes of action held by and against third parties,
which could potentially lead to violations of those creditors’ constitutional
rights. An ABI commission recommended that third-party releases be
enforceable if express consent is obtained.139 Part II highlights the
controversy and confusion surrounding third-party releases and the various
applications of consent.
Part II.A examines the various views applied in courts surrounding
affirmative consent, explicit rejection, and deemed consent. Part II.B
assesses the various views that discuss silence in consent determinations
when deciding whether to approve a binding release. These views vary in
application both across circuits and within districts.

134. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 557–58 (1974); Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589, 596–97 (1931).
135. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
136. Francis J. Lawall & James C. Carignan, Third-Party Plan Releases Require Wide
Support by All Creditor Classes, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (Oct. 15, 2010),
https://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/third-party-plan-releases-require-wide-support-byall-creditor-classes-2010-10-15/ [https://perma.cc/E4YS-DX5R].
137. See supra Parts I.A–B.
138. See, e.g., McLendon & Picón, supra note 45; Schwartz & Perez, supra note 9.
139. AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 14, at 255.
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A. Affirmative Consent (Opt In) and Deemed Consent (Failure to Opt Out)
Affirmative consent or rejection is typically viewed as a voluntary, express
statement in support of or opposition to an action.140 In the bankruptcy plan
context, these can be applied through opt-in or opt-out provisions in a
bankruptcy plan ballot.141
1. Must Opt In to Consent
Opting in to a third-party release is an affirmative step that enables a court
to easily determine whether approval of a third-party release within the plan
is truly consensual.142 Yet, while opting in can provide clarity, it is not
applied or required by all bankruptcy judges when approving a plan or ballot.
In In re Chassix Holdings, Inc.,143 Judge Michael E. Wiles of the Southern
District of New York set out five different categories of voting and nonvoting
creditor parties and indicated whether each category had consented or could
be deemed to have consented to the third-party releases.144 Judge Wiles
reasoned: (1) creditors who submit a ballot and vote in favor of the plan
affirmatively consent to the release;145 (2) creditors who submit a ballot and
vote to reject the plan but opt in to the release affirmatively consent to the
release;146 (3) creditors who are entitled to vote but fail to return a ballot, thus
abstaining from voting, do not affirmatively consent and are not deemed to
consent to the release;147 (4) creditors holding claims in classes “deemed to
reject” the plan but who neither affirmatively consent nor are deemed to
consent to the release are deemed to reject the release;148 and (5) creditors
holding claims that are unimpaired and are in classes deemed to accept the
plan do not affirmatively consent and are not deemed to consent to the
release.149

140. 8 LEVIN & SOMMER, supra note 1, ¶ 1141.02[5][b].
141. In re Chassix Holdings, Inc., 533 B.R. 64, 80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).
142. Id.
143. 533 B.R. 64 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015). In Chassix, debtors sought confirmation of a
plan that included broad third-party releases and the ballot in question contained an opt-in
provision so that the creditors voting could reject the plan and decide whether to release their
claims if the plan was ultimately confirmed. Id. at 76.
144. See id. at 77–81.
145. Id. at 80.
146. Id.
147. Id. A consenting creditor includes a claimholder who voted to accept the plan or a
claimholder who voted to reject the plan but affirmatively elects to provide releases by opting
in on the ballot. Id. at 75. The additional step of “affirmative election” refers to checking the
opt-in provision on the ballot and approving the release associated with the plan. This enabled
Judge Wiles to consider the creditor to have “affirmatively consented” to the release. Id.
148. Id. at 81 (“As to creditors and interest holders who were deemed to reject the Plan
(and therefore were given no opportunity to vote or to ‘opt in’ to the releases): it would defy
common sense to conclude that those parties had ‘consented’ to releases.”). Judge Wiles left
an opening to provide “deemed to reject” classes with a specific opt-in mechanism in future
cases since he highlighted that those creditors were not given the opportunity to opt in to the
release. See id.
149. Id. at 80–81.
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2. Failure to Opt Out as Consent
Failing to opt out of a release when voting on a plan has different judicial
significance and application when determining the consent connected to a
third-party release.
The Chassix court found that compelling a creditor who is affirmatively
rejecting a plan to additionally opt out of a release effectively sets a trap for
inattentive creditors. If a creditor rejects the plan, it also would likely reject
the third-party releases within the plan and a further opt out would be
redundant.150 The court viewed an affirmative opt-in vote as a way to prevent
the loss a right to claims due to the voter’s inattention; so, failure to
additionally opt out would not be considered consent.151 Therefore, if
creditors vote to approve the plan, they are considered to have affirmatively
consented to the third-party releases; if the creditors reject the plan, they are
only bound to the third-party release if they opt in. This application of the
Bankruptcy Code closely protects creditors who Judge Wiles considers
impaired by the existence of third-party releases.
In In re SunEdison, Inc.,152 Judge Stuart M. Bernstein of the Southern
District of New York stated that courts typically agree that an affirmative
vote to accept a plan containing a third-party release constitutes express
consent to the release.153 However, accepting the plan may be insufficient
where the plan does not also include an option to opt out of the release.154 A
creditor’s affirmative vote for the plan and failure to opt out where an optout provision is present can constitute consent for the release consistent with
contract law.155 Judge Bernstein highlighted Chassix: “[c]harging all
inactive creditors with full knowledge of the scope and implications of the
proposed third party releases, and implying a ‘consent’ to the third party
releases based on the creditors’ inaction, is simply not realistic or fair, and
would stretch the meaning of ‘consent’ beyond the breaking point.”156

150. See id. at 79.
151. See id.
152. 576 B.R. 453 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017).
153. Id. at 458 (collecting cases).
154. McLendon & Picón, supra note 45. The SunEdison plan ballot did not include an optout provision. In re SunEdison, 576 B.R. at 460 n.8. While the plan originally stated the
parties were to be released by “all Holders of Claims entitled to vote for or against the Plan
that do not vote to reject the plan,” Judge Bernstein believed those deemed to reject the plan
still need an opt-out opportunity. Id. at 455. “Non-voting classes deemed to reject the Plan
under 11 U.S.C. § 1126(g) could not be bound by the Release. Such a provision would violate
the best interest test under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) and render the Plan unconfirmable.”
Id. at 457 n.4.
155. See Alexander J. Nicas, SDNY Bankruptcy Court Rejects Non-Consensual ThirdParty Releases, KRAMER LEVIN: BROKEN BENCH BYTES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://
www.kramerlevin.com/pdf-gen/result/32873/SDNY%20Bankruptcy%20Court%
20Rejects%20Non-Consensual%20Third-Party%20Releases%20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AUW2-MZ2L].
156. In re SunEdison, 576 B.R. at 460 (citing In re Chassix Holdings, 533 B.R. at 81).
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In In re Washington Mutual, Inc.,157 Judge Mary F. Walrath of the District
of Delaware found that the bankruptcy court could not grant a binding thirdparty release absent the parties’ consent, which could be obtained by voting
in favor of the plan and not opting out; failure to opt out was considered
consent.158 The third-party releases before the same judge in In re
Southeastern Grocers, LLC159 were considered consensual for: (1) holders
of impaired claims or interests who were entitled to vote and accepted the
plan, (2) holders of unimpaired claims who did not timely object to the
releases, and (3) creditors who rejected or abstained from voting on the plan
but did not indicate on their ballots an intent to opt out of the releases.160
In In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC.,161 Judge Brendan L. Shannon of the
District of Delaware, after evaluating the Master Mortgage factors, deemed
releases that included an opt-out provision consensual.162 If a creditor does
not directly opt out of the release, the creditor will be bound by the release if
the plan is confirmed.163 The opt-out approach results in third-party releases
that bind (1) parties who affirmatively vote to accept the plan, (2) parties who
affirmatively reject the plan and do not opt out of the release, (3) unimpaired
parties who are deemed to accept the plan and the releases,164 and (4) parties
who are entitled to vote and abstain from both voting and opting out of the
third-party release by not returning the ballot.165 The only parties not bound
by the third-party releases are those who opted out of the release and those
who are deemed to reject the plan—all other creditors “consented” to the

157. 442 B.R. 314 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
158. Id. at 355. The original plan in Washington Mutual had a problem in that it provided
that the creditors who affirmatively rejected the plan’s releases by opting out would still
remain bound. Id. at 351. The debtors ultimately removed that provision as the court found it
invalid. In re Wash. Mut., 442 B.R. at 352. Judge Walrath noted that she had previously held
that the bankruptcy court does not have the power to grant a third-party release absent consent.
Id. at 351–52 (citing In re Coram Healthcare Corp., 315 B.R. 321, 335 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004)).
There exists a conflict between Judge Silverstein’s opinion in Millennium Lab Holdings II and
Judge Walrath’s opinion in Washington Mutual, as the two cases, both in Delaware, come to
differing conclusions. Millennium Lab Holdings II permits nonconsensual releases and
Washington Mutual does not. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
159. No. 18-10700 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. filed Mar. 27, 2018).
160. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (I) Approving Debtors’ (A)
Disclosure Statement (B) Solicitation of Votes and Voting Procedures and (C) Form of
Ballots, and (II) Confirming Amended Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization
of Southeastern Grocers, LLC and Its Affiliated Debtors (Other Than Winn-Dixie Warehouse
Leasing, LLC) at 80, In re Se. Grocers, LLC, No. 18-10700 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. May 14,
2018), ECF No. 487 [hereinafter Southeastern Confirmation Order].
161. 486 B.R. 286 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013).
162. Id. at 303–04. Judge Shannon’s approach to third-party releases is different from
Judge Wiles’s approach, as Judge Shannon appears more relaxed regarding what counts as
consent for approval of the releases. See supra notes 143–51 and accompanying text; see also
infra Part II.A.3.
163. In re Indianapolis Downs, 486 B.R. at 304–05.
164. According to Judge Shannon, unimpaired creditors can be deemed to accept the plan
and releases, something Judge Wiles explicitly expressed concern over. See supra notes 145–
49 and accompanying text.
165. In re Indianapolis Downs, 486 B.R. at 304–05.
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release.166 The knowing167 failure to opt out was what made the release
consensual.168
3. How to Treat Unimpaired Creditors
Bankruptcy courts disagree on whether unimpaired creditors, who are
presumed to accept a plan, should be deemed to have consented to a release
within the plan without a vote on such releases.169 The Bankruptcy Code
sets out the treatment for unimpaired creditors as being presumed to accept
the plan without voting.170 Courts consider unimpaired creditors to have
consented to the releases because those creditors will be paid in full and will
receive consideration for the releases.171 However, there appears to be
disagreement regarding whether or not the existence of the release creates an
impairment to an otherwise unimpaired creditor where they should no longer
be presumed to accept the plan.172
Judge Wiles found the idea of restricting the rights of nondebtor parties
via a third-party release without consent to be troubling.173 He required
unimpaired creditors, who by definition are said to approve the plan, to opt
in to the releases, and he is critical of the use of deemed consent.174
If a creditor must release a claim against a third party under a plan (as a
condition to whatever payment or other treatment the plan provides for the
creditor’s claim against the debtor), it is difficult to understand how such a

166. See id. at 305.
167. Judge Shannon did not establish the level of knowledge required to be bound.
Additionally, Judge Shannon did not discuss whether there is a due process issue if the
creditors affected by the releases do not “know” that they will lose a right.
168. Ward & Vine, supra note 83. Judge Shannon’s view conflicts with Judge Walrath’s
Washington Mutual decision, in which she held that the failure to return the ballot was not
consensual. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
169. Compare In re Indianapolis Downs, 486 B.R. 286 (holding that failure to opt out
regardless of impairment or deemed acceptance status results in being bound), with
Southeastern Confirmation Order, supra note 160 (holding that all creditors, including those
unimpaired and deemed to accept, must consent to the release to be bound).
170. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (2012) (“[A] class that is not impaired under a plan, and each
holder of a claim or interest of such class, are conclusively presumed to have accepted the
plan, and solicitation of acceptances with respect to such class from the holders of claims or
interests of such class is not required.”).
171. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Wilmington Tr. Co. (In re Spansion, Inc.), 426
B.R. 114, 144 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (“[N]o creditor or interest holder whose rights are
affected by the ‘deemed’ acceptance language has objected to the Plan . . . . [T]he silence of
the unimpaired classes on this issue is persuasive . . . . The unimpaired classes are being paid
in full and have received adequate consideration for the release.”).
172. See In re Chassix Holdings, Inc., 533 B.R. 64, 81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).
173. Ryan Boysen, Westinghouse Secures Approval of Ch. 11 Plan, LAW360 (Mar. 27,
2018, 6:14 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1026925/westinghouse-secures-approvalof-ch-11-plan [https://perma.cc/LM8J-JS52]; see also infra note 201 and accompanying text.
See generally Transcript of Confirmation Hearing, In re Westinghouse Elec. Co. LLC, No.
17-10751 (MEW) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018) [hereinafter Westinghouse Transcript].
174. Boysen, supra note 173; see also In re Chassix Holdings, 533 B.R. at 81.
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creditor could properly be considered to be “unimpaired” by the Plan in the
first place.175

He stated that “[t]here are circumstances in which public policy justifies a
rule under which people are bound by a proposed action unless they take
affirmative steps to note their disagreement.”176 He explained that thirdparty releases are different from those circumstances.177 There is no “general
‘public policy’ in favor of making third-party releases applicable to as many
creditors as possible.”178 Additionally, there is no rule that mentions an optout mechanism or a deemed consent mechanism concerning third-party
releases.179
In In re Southeastern Grocers, LLC, Judge Walrath—the judge who
decided the Washington Mutual case—held that unimpaired creditors should
not be deemed to have voted in favor of a release.180 This is perhaps because
the statute deems unimpaired creditors to have accepted the plan181 but the
statute does not mention third-party releases—let alone whether unimpaired
creditors should be considered to approve them without further vote. Judge
Walrath held that all creditors, even those unimpaired, should be required to
affirmatively consent to a release for the release to be deemed consensual;
however, if the opt-out provision is present, consent is found in the failure to
opt out if creditors are given the opportunity to vote.182
In In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC, Judge Silverstein found it
permissible to impose third-party releases on parties unable to vote and
whose rights were allegedly unaffected by the plan,183 also known as
unimpaired creditors.184 Section 1124(1) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth
the conditions under which a class of claims is impaired.185 According to
Judge Silverstein, this section applies impairment only to claims against the
debtor and not to claims against third parties that may be liable to the
unimpaired creditors.186 Therefore, creditors deemed unimpaired against the
175. In re Chassix Holdings, 533 B.R. at 81.
176. Id. at 78.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Southeastern Confirmation Order, supra note 160, at 80 (“[H]olders of
Unimpaired Claims or Interests shall not be deemed to have released the Debtors.”). Holders
of unimpaired claims could opt out of the releases by filing an objection instead of the
traditional opt out. Id. at 10, 58–59.
181. See supra notes 26, 170 and accompanying text.
182. See generally Southeastern Confirmation Order, supra note 160 (noting that an optout provision must be present to find consent in the lack of response). The creditors who
objected to the releases were carved out and deemed not to be bound. Id. at 59.
183. Richard Epling, Uses and Possible Misuses of 3rd-Party Releases in Ch. 11, LAW360
(Sept. 7, 2017, 4:14 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/961748/uses-and-possiblemisuses-of-3rd-party-releases-in-ch-11 [https://perma.cc/JE87-SRLK].
184. 575 B.R. 252, 262–64 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Opt-Out Lenders v.
Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC (In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC), 591 B.R. 559
(D. Del. 2018).
185. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1) (2012).
186. Epling, supra note 183. Section 1124(1) does not define what constitutes impairment
of a creditor’s claim, but it states that a creditor is impaired unless the plan leaves unaltered
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debtor may be deemed to accept the plan and the plan’s third-party releases
without express approval because the third-party release does not itself cause
impairment.187
In In re Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd.,188 the U.S. trustee objected to
third-party releases because the claimholders did not affirmatively consent to
those releases.189 The trustee also argued that a release granted solely
because a party was deemed unimpaired under a plan would violate
§ 1124(1) of the Code in that requiring an unimpaired holder of a claim or
interest to grant a release would effectively mean that the holder would
relinquish legal rights and, thus, would be impaired.190 Although the court
agreed that the classification of a claim or interest as unimpaired should not
be equated with the granting of a release,191 Judge Sean H. Lane of the
Southern District of New York nevertheless found that a plan can require the
holders of unimpaired claims or equity interests to grant a release to
nondebtors even when such parties were not entitled to vote on the plan and
did not otherwise consent to, or have an opportunity to opt out of, granting
such a release.192 Therefore, the third-party releases in Genco Shipping were
permissible if the “Metromedia factors” were satisfied.193
Judge Shannon in Indianapolis Downs found that failure to opt out results
in a binding third-party release, regardless of impairment or deemed
acceptance of the plan status.194

the contractual rights to claims held by the creditor. Additionally, it does not explicitly limit
impairment to claims against only the debtor. See id.; see also In re Millennium Lab Holdings
II, 575 B.R. at 262–64; Transcript of Hearing at 26–57, In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, 575
B.R. 252 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017) (No. 15–12284 (LSS)), ECF No. 206 [hereinafter Millennium
Transcript].
187. Judge Silverstein stated in her 2015 oral bench ruling that the nonvoting creditors
consented because (1) the notice of nonvoting status was served on all known nonvoting class
members and (2) the releases were in bold and full text, so the nonvoting creditors, including
the unsecured creditors, were on notice of the releases and did not object. See Millennium
Transcript, supra note 186, at 27–28; Quirk & Grasso, supra note 52. Regarding her 2015
ruling, Judge Silverstein stated, “this ruling is not to be cited back to me.” See Millennium
Transcript, supra note 186, at 5; Quirk & Grasso, supra note 52.
188. 513 B.R. 233 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).
189. Id. at 269.
190. Frank Grese, Release Me! Release Me!: S.D.N.Y Bankruptcy Court Upholds Certain
Non-Consensual Non-Debtor Releases Granted by Unimpaired Creditors and Equity Holders,
WEIL BANKR. BLOG (July 22, 2014), https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/releasesexculpations/release-me-release-me-s-d-n-y-bankruptcy-court-upholds-certain-nonconsensual-non-debtor-releases-granted-by-unimpaired-creditors-and-equity-holders/
[https://perma.cc/6XX9-HWGN].
191. In Genco Shipping & Trading, 513 B.R. at 270.
192. See id. at 272.
193. See id. at 271.
194. In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC, 486 B.R. 286, 304–05 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013).
According to Judge Shannon, unimpaired creditors can be deemed to accept the plan and the
releases, something Judge Wiles explicitly expressed concern over. See supra notes 173–75
and accompanying text.
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B. Can You Be Bound Through Silence?
There are differing opinions surrounding a court’s ability to enforce a
binding third-party release premised on the silence of creditors who neither
expressly supported nor opposed the presence of a release. Silence and its
potential to be considered deemed or implied consent have different
implications according to different judges both within and across districts.
1. Silence Is Not Binding
Chassix cited Washington Mutual for the holding that “‘inaction’ was not
a sufficient manifestation of consent to support a release.”195 Chassix is
rooted in agreement with Washington Mutual while seemingly disagreeing
with the view of inaction espoused in Indianapolis Downs, stating:
“[c]harging all inactive creditors with full knowledge of the scope and
implications of the proposed third party releases, and implying a ‘consent’ to
the third party releases based on the creditors’ inaction, is simply not realistic
or fair, and would stretch the meaning of ‘consent’ beyond the breaking
point.”196
In re Westinghouse Electric Co.197 reaffirmed Chassix and went further in
its discussion of silence and inaction.198 The Westinghouse ballot199
contained an opt-in provision, which could be checked off indicating plan
approval and release approval.200 On the deemed consent issue, Judge Wiles
stated:
the notion that you’re taking away somebody else’s property without
additional compensation for it, without identification to what the claims . . .
are, without an explanation of why those specific claims can fairly be
extinguished, without a proper assessment as to what the actual value of
those claims might be, that’s extremely troubling to me.201

195. In re Chassix Holdings, Inc., 533 B.R. 64, 81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing In re
Wash. Mut., Inc., 442 B.R. 314, 355 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011)).
196. Id.
197. No. 17-10751 (MEW) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 29, 2017).
198. See Westinghouse Transcript, supra note 173, at 29–30 (viewing Westinghouse in
light of the Chassix holding).
199. The ballot in Westinghouse stated:
IF YOU VOTE TO ACCEPT THE PLAN, YOU WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE
GRANTED THE RELEASES CONTAINED IN . . . THE PLAN, AS SET FORTH
ABOVE. IF YOU VOTE TO REJECT THE PLAN AND YOU WISH TO
RELEASE CLAIMS YOU MAY HAVE AGAINST THE RELEASED PARTIES
AS SET FORTH ABOVE, YOU MAY CHECK THE BOX BELOW TO OPT
INTO THE RELEASES; HOWEVER YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO DO SO.
Order Approving (A) Proposed Disclosure Statement, (B) Solicitation and Voting Procedures,
(C) Notice and Objection Procedures for Confirmation of Debtors’ Plan and Other Relief, (D)
Procedures for Assumption and Assignment of Contracts, and (E) The Form of 363 Sale
Notice as Alternative Relief at 33, In re Westinghouse Elec. Co., No. 17-10751 (MEW)
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2018), ECF No. 2632.
200. Id.
201. Westinghouse Transcript, supra note 173, at 39.
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Judge Wiles, while not explicitly raising due process concerns, stated that the
releases should not apply to those who did not actually consent explicitly and
required the scope of the releases to be clarified and limited.202 His statement
appears to allude to the potential due process problems that follow from
taking away a potential property right through silence.
In SunEdison, Judge Bernstein raised concerns as to whether broad thirdparty releases could and should be allowed to bind nonvoting creditors who
were entitled to vote.203 Judge Bernstein found that the debtors failed to
show that nonvoting creditors had consented, either expressly or impliedly,
to the releases and the debtors failed to show that said releases were
appropriate under the Metromedia factors.204 The court held that the failure
to return a plan ballot—that is, silence—would not constitute consent.205
The “conspicuous” warnings, stemming from Rule 3016, in the SunEdison
disclosure statements and ballots regarding the releases did not overcome the
court’s threshold for consent, as these warnings were not deemed sufficient
or specific enough to allow for consent through silence.206
Judge Bernstein viewed implied consent as a contractual issue.207
Referring to general principles of New York contract law, he found that
generally, “[a]bsent a duty to speak, silence does not constitute consent.”208
The court agreed that there exists three exceptions to the general rule that
silence should not be viewed as consent under New York law: (1) when it is
supported by the parties’ ongoing course of conduct; (2) when the offeree
accepts the benefits of the offer despite a reasonable opportunity to reject
them and understands that the offeror expects compensation; and (3) when
the offeror has given the offeree reason to understand that that silence will
constitute acceptance and the offeree in remaining silent intends to accept the

202. In re Chassix Holdings, Inc., 533 B.R. 64, 77 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015). Judge Wiles
discusses due process in his 2019 bench decision denying the use of nonconsensual third-party
releases in a proposed plan. In re Aegean Marine Petroleum Network, Inc., 599 B.R. 717,
724–25 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019).
203. In re SunEdison, Inc., 576 B.R. 453, 455 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017).
204. Id.
205. Judge Bernstein cited Chassix and Washington Mutual to support the notion that
inaction cannot constitute consent. Id. at 460 (first citing In re Chassix Holdings, 533 B.R. at
81; then citing In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 442 B.R. 314, 355 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011)); see Matthew
A. Feldman, Christopher S. Koenig & Jason D. St. John, New York Bankruptcy Court Issues
Opinion Denying Proposed Third-Party Releases in SunEdison, 14 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 76,
77–78 (2018).
206. See In re SunEdison, 576 B.R. at 460–61; see also Matthew Kelsey et al., The Battle
over 3rd-Party Releases Continues, LAW360 (Nov. 17, 2017, 4:40 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/986673/the-battle-over-3rd-party-releases-continues
[https://perma.cc/E7E4-5V9T].
207. In re SunEdison, 576 B.R. at 458.
208. Id. (“An offeror has no power to transform an offeree’s silence into acceptance when
the offeree does not intend to accept the offer.” (quoting Karlin v. Avis, 457 F.2d 57, 62 (2d
Cir. 1972))); see also James A. Wright III et al., Silence Is Not Consent: SunEdison Court
Rejects Third Party Releases by Passive Consent, K&L GATES (Nov. 30, 2017),
http://www.klgates.com/silence-is-not-consent-sunedison-court-rejects-third-party-releasesby-passive-consent-11-30-2017/ [https://perma.cc/AZ5V-M56G].
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offer.209 Nonetheless, these exceptions are narrow: “As explained by the
New York Court of Appeals: ‘Silence operates as an assent, and creates an
estoppel, only when it has the effect to mislead.’”210 In the end, the court
found the releases in SunEdison too broad and the related ballots unclear
regarding opting out.211 In re Breitburn Energy Partners LP212 reaffirmed
SunEdison’s take on third-party releases. The Breitburn ballot release optout provision was far clearer than the SunEdison ballot on its effect and due
to the fact that the opt-out provision was present, the ballot was approved to
be sent out to creditors.213
Judge Walrath in Washington Mutual held that failing to return a ballot is
not “sufficient manifestation” of consent to a third-party release214 and
concluded that “any third party release is effective only with respect to those
who affirmatively consented to it by voting in favor of the Plan and not opting
out of the third-party releases.”215 However, Judge Walrath found that if
creditors received the opportunity to opt out of the release, the presence of
the opt-out provision would be sufficient to deem the releases consensual for
the parties who failed to return a ballot.216
2. Silence Is Binding
Judge Shelly C. Chapman of the Southern District of New York disagreed
with Judge Wiles’s view in Chassix, which stated that requiring creditors
who have rejected or are deemed to have rejected a plan to opt out of a third-

209. In re SunEdison, 576 B.R. at 459 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 69(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)).
210. Id. (quoting Tanenbaum Textile Co. v. Schlanger, 40 N.E.2d 225, 227 (N.Y. 1942)).
Judge Bernstein cited both Delaware and New York case law in support of and opposition to
deemed consent through silence. Id. at 459–61. He ultimately concluded that the creditors’
silence was not proven to be misleading and could not be considered consent to the release.
Id. He also stated that the debtors failed to identify the source of the duty to speak pertaining
to the silent creditors. Id. at 460; McLendon & Picón, supra note 45.
211. Alex Wolf, SunEdison Judge Limits Reach of 3rd-Party Releases, LAW360 (Nov. 8,
2017, 9:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/983332/sunedison-judge-limits-reach-of3rd-party-releases [https://perma.cc/Z57E-94J5].
212. No. 16-11390 (SMB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed May 15, 2016).
213. See Order (I) Approving Notice of Disclosure Statement Hearing; (II) Approving
Disclosure Statement; (III) Establishing a Record Date; (IV) Establishing Notice and
Objection Procedures for Confirmation of the Plan; (V) Approving Solicitation Packages and
Procedures for Distribution Thereof; (VI) Approving the Forms of Ballots and Establishing
Procedures for Voting on the Plan; (VII) Approving the Form of Notice to Non-Voting Classes
Under the Plan; and (VIII) Approving the Rights Offering Procedures and Related Matters, In
re Breitburn Energy Partners LP, No. 16-11390 (SMB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2017), ECF
No. 1885 [hereinafter Breitburn Ballot]. The ballot stated that “[i]f you vote to accept or reject
the Plan and submit a ballot without checking the box . . . you will be deemed to consent to
the releases set forth in . . . the Plan. If you fail to vote, you will not be bound by the releases.”
Id. Exhibit A, at 18.
214. In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 442 B.R. 314, 355 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (citing In re Zenith
Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 111 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999)).
215. Id.
216. See id. at 353. Additionally, it is important for those rejecting the plan to opt out of
the releases because they could still be bound by the releases if the plan is approved. Id.
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party release sets up a trap.217 In In re Cumulus Media Inc.,218 the court
reasoned: “Inaction is action under appropriate circumstances. When
someone is clearly and squarely told if you fail to act your rights will be
affected. That person is then given information that puts them on notice that
they need to do something or else. That’s not a trap.”219 Judge Chapman
highlighted that the purpose of Chapter 11 reorganizations should be to give
a fresh start to the debtor.220 Judge Chapman’s view supports consensual
third-party releases provided that notice is clear, the effect of inaction is on
the first page, and the disclosure and ballot clearly direct the recipient to the
ballot’s opt-out section.221 She found that silence in this case constituted
consent and that the standards for nonconsensual releases had been
satisfied.222
The third-party releases in Indianapolis Downs were, according to Judge
Shannon, enforceable against the silent parties who abstained from voting
and did not otherwise return a ballot with the opt-out box checked.223
Because they had the ability to opt out and decided for whatever reason not
to,224 the court considered the parties to have consented to the releases given
that they had the opportunity to affirmatively reject them.225
In February 2018, in In re TK Holdings, Inc.,226 Judge Shannon again
found that creditors who failed to return the ballots were bound to the
releases, as they were deemed to have consented given that the releases
included a provision binding parties who abstained from voting even though
they had the opportunity to opt out.227 Under the ballot approved by Judge

217. Cumulus Transcript, supra note 115, at 27–28; see also In re Chassix Holdings, Inc.,
533 B.R. 64, 79 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015); McLendon & Picón, supra note 45.
218. No. 17-13381 (SCC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 29, 2017).
219. Cumulus Transcript, supra note 115, at 27–28; see also McLendon & Picón, supra
note 45.
220. Cumulus Transcript, supra note 115, at 28; McLendon & Picón, supra note 45.
221. McLendon & Picón, supra note 45 (citing Cumulus Transcript, supra note 115, at 27–
28, 30, 36).
222. See id.
223. In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC, 486 B.R. 286, 306 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013).
224. “[T]he record reflects these parties were provided detailed instructions on how to opt
out, and had the opportunity to do so by marking their ballots.” Id.
225. Id. at 305. The U.S. trustee filed an objection to enforceability of the releases against
the silent creditors absent affirmative consent. Id. at 304. Judge Shannon stated that “case law
teaches that no such hard and fast rule applies . . . [The Spansion court] noted that no creditor
or interest holder whose rights were affected by the ‘deemed’ acceptance language objected
to the plan, and that ‘the silence of the unimpaired classes on this issue is persuasive.’” Id. at
305 (quoting U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Wilmington Tr. Co. (In re Spansion, Inc.), 426 B.R.
114, 144 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010)).
226. No. 17-11375 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. filed June 25, 2017).
227. Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 502, 1125, 1126, and 1128, Fed. R. Bankr. P.
2002, 3003, 3016, 3017, 3018, 3020, and 9006, and Local Rules 2002-1, 3017-1, and 9006-1
for Entry of an Order (I) Approving the Proposed Disclosure Statement and the Form and
Manner of the Notice of a Hearing Thereon, (II) Establishing Solicitation and Voting
Procedures, and (III) Establishing Notice and Objection Procedures for Confirmation of the
Debtors’ Plan, In re TK Holdings, Inc., No. 17-11375 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 5, 2018), ECF No.
1639 [hereinafter TK Order]. The ballot for voting creditors stated:
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Shannon, parties who were deemed to have rejected the TK Holdings plan
were able to opt out of the release only by filling out the opt-out provision.228
There, silence was deemed consent because there was a warning that such
silence would bind the parties to the releases and the creditor could be
assumed to have read the plan’s terms.229
Once again, in May 2018, Judge Shannon confirmed the use of third-party
releases in In re Remington Outdoor Co.230 with the same opt-out mechanism
found in Indianapolis Downs.231 The U.S. trustee objected to the release and
argued that silence should not be viewed as assent.232 Judge Shannon
responded to the U.S. trustee’s objection by stating that, while he was open
to revisiting Indianapolis Downs and the opt-out mechanism, Remington did
not present the appropriate circumstances.233 He did require that “employees
and former employees of the debtor and the former employees and current
employees of the releasing parties . . . be stricken from” the list of releasing
parties as those employees should not be expected to be on notice that they
were given such releases and including “employees” in the release could
inadvertently lead to the unintentional release of employees’ claims.234
Judge Shannon’s removal of employees appears to make an effort to narrow
an otherwise sweeping release.
YOU MAY CHECK THE BOX BELOW TO OPT OUT OF THE RELEASE
ONLY IF YOU VOTE TO REJECT THE PLAN. IF YOU (I) VOTE TO
ACCEPT THE PLAN, (II) DO NOT SUBMIT A BALLOT TO ACCEPT OR
REJECT THE PLAN, OR (III) REJECT THE PLAN BUT DO NOT OPT OUT OF
THE RELEASE PROVISIONS OF THE PLAN, YOU WILL BE DEEMED TO
HAVE GRANTED THE RELEASES.
Id. Exhibit 3, at 16.
228. Id. Exhibit 4-2, at 3 (“[W]hile you are not entitled to vote to accept or reject the Plan,
the opt out election . . . provides you with the separate option to not grant the voluntary release
of the Released Parties . . . .”).
229. Id.
230. No. 18-10684 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. filed Mar. 25, 2018).
231. Transcript of Hearing at 103, In re Remington Outdoor Co., No. 18-10684 (BLS)
(Bankr. D. Del. May 2, 2018) [hereinafter Remington Transcript]. The transcript makes clear
that the releases involved are third-party releases. See id. at 52–53 (“[W]e’re talking about the
third-party releases, not the debtor releases.”).
232. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also objected to the plan due to
silence being considered consent under the plan. Id. at 43. The SEC went on to say that
“parties should be able to consent to the releases separately and apart from voting to accept
the plan.” Id.
233. Id. at 72–73. The Remington ballot addressed the repercussions of a silent response
to the ballot by stating: “If the Plan is confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court, it will be made
binding upon you regardless of whether or not you vote and regardless of whether or not [the
class] accepts the Plan.” Debtors' Motion for Entry of (I) Order (A) Scheduling Combined
Hearing on Adequacy of Disclosure Statement and Confirmation of Plan, (B) Approving Form
and Manner of Notice of Combined Hearing and Commencement of Chapter 11 Cases, (C)
Approving Solicitation of Non-Accredited Holders, (D) Establishing Procedures for Objecting
to Disclosure Statement or Plan, (E) Conditionally Waiving Requirement to File Statements
and Schedules, and (F) Directing That a Meeting of Creditors Not Be Convened, and (II) Order
(A) Approving Prepetition Solicitation Procedures, (B) Approving Adequacy of Disclosure
Statement, and (C) Confirming Plan, Exhibit D at 3, In re Remington Outdoor Co., No. 1810684 (Mar. 25, 2018), ECF No. 12-4 [hereinafter Remington Ballot].
234. Remington Transcript, supra note 231, at 69.
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Without addressing the due process concerns associated with silent
creditors, the court reaffirmed its approval of the opt-out provision235 and
construed silence as acceptance, so long as the parties that were not
employees received the ballot and did not specifically opt out.236
III. HOW DO WE PROTECT CREDITORS’ RIGHTS?
The Constitution clearly requires due process.237 Due process, however,
is not frequently examined, questioned, or evaluated in Chapter 11 plan
approvals containing third-party releases. To protect creditors’ due process
rights, it is important for courts and practitioners to recognize the connection
between due process and consent to relinquish a claim against a nondebtor
third-party during plan confirmations. Both contract law and due process
rights are embedded in the debate of what constitutes consent to a third-party
release and whether consent can be deemed through silence.238 If the
creditors do not bring up the due process issue found within a consent
determination in a motion on their own, courts should do so sua sponte, as
the issue is one of great importance.239
A. Permissibility: Which Consent Approach?
The Seventh Circuit’s approach to the permissibility240 of third-party
releases regardless of a consent determination carries a potential problem as
it appears to have no limit as to what the bankruptcy courts could ultimately
implement in pursuit of a plan’s confirmation.241 Sections 105 and 1123
have the potential to act as blank checks for the bankruptcy courts to do

235. The opt-out provision stated (in bold type):
IF YOU VOTED TO REJECT THE PLAN OR ABSTAINED FROM VOTING
AND YOU DO NOT OPT OUT OF THE THIRD-PARTY RELEASES BY
CHECKING THE BOX BELOW, YOU WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE
UNCONDITIONALLY, IRREVOCABLY AND FOREVER RELEASED AND
DISCHARGED THE RELEASED PARTIES (AS DEFINED IN THE PLAN)
FROM, INTER ALIA, ANY AND ALL CAUSES OF ACTION (AS DEFINED IN
THE PLAN) EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED IN THE
PLAN.
Remington Ballot, supra note 233, at 9.
236. Remington Transcript, supra note 231, at 72–73 (confirming the plan as consistent
with Indianapolis Downs); see supra Part II.A (explaining Judge Shannon’s views on
affirmative consent and affirmative rejection in both Indianapolis Downs and Remington). In
Remington, if creditors voted to accept the plan, they were similarly deemed to have accepted
the third-party release. Remington Transcript, supra note 231, at 69–73.
237. See supra Parts I.F–G, II.
238. See supra Part I.F.
239. See supra Part I.G. Judge Bernstein raised sua sponte whether a nonvoting creditor
consented to a release. In re SunEdison, Inc., 576 B.R. 453, 455 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017).
Judge Wiles in In re Aegean Marine Petroleum Network, Inc., 599 B.R. 717, 725 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2019) stated, “we should not lose sight of the fact that when we impose involuntary
releases we do not provide claimants with other procedural and substantive rights that they
ordinarily would have.”
240. See supra Part I.C.
241. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
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whatever they deem necessary to confirm a plan.242 The majority view,243
however, allows third-party releases in limited circumstances, and each
circuit applies a different multifactor analysis.244 The majority view provides
creditors with some due process protection, depending on the determination
of consent, and enables the confirmation of plans that are tied to third parties
receiving a release. The various factors and standards applied in majorityview circuits to determine the permissibility of third-party releases do not
necessarily need to be changed. However, a single set of factors would
promote greater consistency across bankruptcy courts.
B. Defining Consent While Considering Due Process
A definition of consent in the context of third-party releases would protect
creditors bound by those releases. Due process violations could be avoided
if consent was obtained on an individual level; this avoids the removal of an
individual’s claim or right simply because a majority voted to do so. One
creditor’s choice to waive their rights should not have any effect on another
creditor’s rights. Because a plan is confirmed upon approval by every class
of creditor and the court, a plan will not necessarily be stopped because one
creditor does not want to release the nondebtor third party. This Note
considers a requirement that creditors affirmatively consent to third-party
releases to be the best method to avoid due process violations. This would
allow a court to approve the plan containing a third-party release even if
individual creditors opt in or out of the release. Creditors that reject the plan
should not be bound by a third-party release unless they opt in to said
release.245
Allowing creditors who either abstain from voting or reject a plan but fail
to opt out to be bound by a release ignores the contract principle that a person
cannot be deemed to accept or be bound through silence or inaction.246
Reducing or removing the ability for courts to approve third-party releases
through consent-by-silence will protect those silent creditors’ due process
rights. Because silence can be viewed to have various meanings, courts
should not assume that silence means consent and releases should not apply
to silent parties.247 Silent ballots should not extinguish claims held by
creditors by default because these deemed-consent ballots violate due
process. Allowing silent-ballot creditors to maintain their claims does not
mean that the creditor will necessarily pursue their claims, but it does protect
their due process rights by not releasing their claims without affirmative
consent. Using an opt-out provision instead of requiring creditors to file
physical objections to the releases in court enables creditors to easily vote
242. See, e.g., supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
243. See supra Part I.B.
244. See supra Part I.D.
245. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.3, II.B.1.
246. See, e.g., Karlin v. Avis, 457 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1972); Albrecht Chem. Co. v.
Anderson Trading Corp., 84 N.E.2d 625, 626 (N.Y. 1949); see also supra Parts I.E, II.
247. See supra Part II.B.1.
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when they otherwise might refrain due to the costs and effort of hiring an
attorney.248
C. Increasing Clarity of Third-Party Releases for the Benefit of Creditors
Aligning with the ABI’s recommendation, this Note recommends that
third-party releases should be “clearly and conspicuously highlighted and
explained in the plan and the disclosure statement.”249 Ballots currently
contain pages of bold and all-caps text250 that may lead a creditor to
misunderstand the meaning of the third-party release. To better comply with
the “conspicuous” requirements of Rule 3016(c), ballots should be clearer as
to the who, what, and how of these releases—even at the expense of slowing
down plan confirmations.251 Judge Shannon’s philosophy that a creditor is
bound to a release when they have not specifically opted out carries the
worrisome possibility that a creditor who does not understand the release will
lose their right to have their claims heard, which potentially creates due
process violations.252
Plan ballots should explicitly identify the scope of the release, the parties
covered, and the consequences of opting in or out of the release to avoid
improperly eliminating creditors’ rights and claims against third parties.253
This is particularly important in plans containing blanket releases—where
the claims being released may be unknown254—because of the breadth of
possibilities and risks to due process. Broad releases should not be approved
freely. Courts should require the “broader” releases, if necessary for the plan,
to include topics or headings that narrow down the provided or asked-for
releases to avoid due process violations and public policy concerns.255 It
seems very difficult to justify a blanket waiver of unknown claims, and courts
should attempt to align third-party release doctrine with established contract
law.
Releases and disclosure statements should be sent to every individual or
creditor who would be bound if the plan were confirmed, regardless of
impairment. Individual creditors deemed to reject the plan should also be
given the opportunity to opt out of the releases256 in case the plan is
ultimately confirmed, so they do not automatically, and involuntarily, lose
their rights to claims. Third-party releases in a plan should be narrowly
248. See McLendon & Picón, supra note 45.
249. AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 14, at 252; see supra Part I.E.
250. See, e.g., Breitburn Ballot, supra note 213, at 18; TK Order, supra note 227, Exhibit
3, at 16.
251. See supra Part I.E; see also Tina Moss, No Clear Disclosure?: No 3rd-Party Release
in Ch. 11, LAW360 (Jan. 28, 2013, 2:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/410254/noclear-disclosure-no-3rd-party-release-in-ch-11 [https://perma.cc/ZT9R-PWVZ].
252. See supra notes 161–68, 224–28 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.F.
253. See supra Part I.E.
254. AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 14, at 253.
255. For an example of a court “narrowing” the language of a third-party release, see supra
notes 233–34.
256. This idea is aligned with a recommendation by Kathrine McLendon and Lily Picón.
See McLendon & Picón, supra note 45.
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tailored and cover only the most important of the third parties’ concerns, so
the third parties feel covered enough to fund the reorganization.
An additional statement should be placed on the ballot—away from the
general all-bold, all-caps text—that explains what happens if you fail to
return the ballot and what opting out means. This will appropriately highlight
the dangers of consent through silence and make explicitly sure that creditors
know they are waiving a right to a claim, which would potentially reduce due
process violations.257 This additional layer of due process protection may
come at the cost of an expeditious plan confirmation.
D. The Future Use of Third-Party Releases
The use of third-party releases facilitates speedy bankruptcies. It is not
advisable to place a blanket prohibition on using third-party releases—
especially if affirmative consent is given by the creditors issuing a release—
because the releases promote the funding of large corporate restructuring,
which is beneficial for society.258 The “funding facilitation” argument is a
powerful one. It is the concept that a third party can condition their monetary
contribution along the following lines: “I will contribute as long as I know
someone or something will not come out of the woodwork and force me to
pay a multiple of what I thought I was paying to settle this once and for all.
I want to put a cap on my liability exposure.” Third-party releases should
not be eliminated because they are also critical in reaching settlements in
complex disputes, and those settlements are prerequisites to any successful
confirmation of the plan of reorganization.259 Users of these third-party
releases, however, must acknowledge that there is a due process concern and
courts should require additional steps or qualifications to protect creditors’
due process rights.
Until the Supreme Court decides the definition of consent in the
bankruptcy-release context and addresses the due process concerns
surrounding such releases, counsel to debtors should keep the Due Process
Clause in mind in preparing these Chapter 11 plans by specifying both the
released parties by name or readily identifiable group and the claims or
general types of claims to be released, in addition to being prepared to justify
releases on a party-by-party and claim-by-claim basis. Lawyers can utilize
an opt-in ballot to allow for clarity in voting; however, many practitioners
decide to utilize opt-out ballots because opt-in ballots may ultimately lead
too many creditors to not be bound by a plan’s release, and this could impact
reorganization funding conditioned on a certain percentage of creditors
accepting a release. Opting in, however, protects creditors’ rights and

257. See supra Parts I.E, I.G; see also supra notes 150–56.
258. AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 14, at 255 (“[A] blanket prohibition on third-party
releases was inadvisable. The Commissioners discussed case examples and particular fact
patterns in which third-party releases facilitated a confirmable plan and ultimately benefited
all stakeholders.”); see also McLendon & Picón, supra note 45.
259. AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 14, at 255; McLendon & Picón, supra note 45.
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prevents any misunderstandings surrounding whether the release is
voluntary.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has yet to issue a decision or statement regarding the
overlap of due process and third-party nondebtor releases, whether
consensual or nonconsensual. Additionally, the Court has not issued a ruling
regarding third-party releases and their use and role in Chapter 11
restructurings. Such a decision would eliminate the ability for a debtor to
forum shop in bankruptcy courts in search of a court that looks favorably
upon their desired use of third-party releases. The controversy surrounding
the various creditor consent definitions in bankruptcy reorganizations carries
potential due process violations that, if left unresolved, may perpetuate a
violation of creditors’ or other individuals’ constitutional rights. Currently,
executives and officers of businesses who wish to shield and protect
themselves and bankruptcy funders from liability will most likely, through
an informed counsel’s guidance, file for bankruptcy in a jurisdiction that
accepts third-party releases with a low threshold for obtaining consent.260
Courts should be mindful of the potential due process violations associated
with deemed or implied consent to third-party claim releases and should
protect Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Courts should require
creditors to affirmatively consent by expressly opting in to the release on the
plan ballot before approving a plan and release as binding. If courts utilize
the opt-out method, those creditors who are silent—or who do not respond to
the opt-out portion of the ballot—should not be bound. To protect the rights
of releasing creditors, the courts, debtors, and other plan proponents should
ensure that the consent of releasing creditors is affirmatively obtained.

260. See McLendon & Picón, supra note 45; Schwartz & Perez, supra note 9.

